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A PLUMBER WITH WORDS:
SEEKING CONSTITUTIONAL RESPONSIBILITY AND AN END
TO THE LITTLE SISTERS PROBLEM
Alison M. Latimer* and Benjamin L. Berger**
I.

Introduction

Joe Arvay sometimes described his work as a lawyer as being a “plumber
with words”. We think what he meant was that he strived to offer tangible solutions
to concrete problems. In other words, while it’s good to know what the law says,
and what legal enthusiasts think about how the law operates, Charter1 breaches
affect real people, most of them not lawyers. It is the lived experience of the law
that ultimately ought to draw our concern, energy, and talents.2 If you want to bend
the law towards justice, you need to focus remedial attention on what the law
actually does and to whom, and on what the Court can actually do and for whom.
With this focus firmly in place, the constitutional problems that should
engage us look somewhat different. To be sure, one remains interested in that
array of substantive justice issues that surround us. This or that law or policy that
calls for challenge and reform because of how it affects the way that people —
particularly the vulnerable, the powerless, or the unpopular — fare in the world.
But as much as Joe worked to address those kinds of constitutional problems, his
work was also often about a second species of problem: structural defects in the
legal approach to problems that impair our ability to adequately address the

* Alison M. Latimer is a litigator in Vancouver BC. This article draws on legal arguments
developed with Joe in British Columbia Civil Liberties Association v Canada (Attorney
General), 2018 BCSC 62 [BCCLA_Trial] and British Columbia Civil Liberties
Association v Canada (Attorney General), 2019 BCCA 228 [BCCLA_CA], litigation in
which Alison also appeared as counsel.
** Benjamin L. Berger is Professor and York Research Chair in Pluralism and Public Law
at Osgoode Hall Law School, York University. Both authors wish to thank Matthew
Traister (Osgoode, JD) for his superb research and editorial assistance in the preparation
of this article. This article is written with deep love and gratitude for Joseph J. Arvay, OC,
OBC, QC, who was a cherished friend and mentor to us both.
1 Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, ss 1, 7, 15, 24, Part I of the Constitution Act,
1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c 11 [Charter].
2 This is true for academics, as much as it is for practitioners, as one of us has argued. See
Benjamin L Berger, Law’s Religion: Religious Difference and the Claims of
Constitutionalism (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2015) at 35-40.
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justness of our society. Issues like stare decisis,3 costs4 and standing5 so concerned
Joe because they were problems of constitutional litigation, not just problems for
constitutional litigation.
This article addresses another such issue that troubled Joe for many years
and that he was tackling in the final major Charter trial in which he acted – a case
that challenged the constitutional validity of prolonged and indefinite solitary
confinement. The litigation surfaced a number of enduring issues facing litigants
in cases seeking effective remedies for systemic Charter wrongs. The issue on
which we are focusing here is the gap between the remedies available for systemic
Charter wrongs that are found to be the legal effect of a law and those available for
systemic Charter wrongs that are said to be the legal effect of maladministration
of a law — discretionary decisions made by state actors implementing a law. If the
wrongs are found to be caused by the law, the law will be struck down and the
legislator given an opportunity to pass a better law. Not so, if the wrongs are
attributed to flaws in the implementation or administration of the law. Instead, in
such cases, a court might declare a constitutional wrong and perhaps grant a
s. 24(1) remedy,6 but the law itself would be undisturbed and, in the often very
predictable event that problems in the administration of that law persisted, it
would fall to future claimants to raise those issues again (and again and again).
Tracing constitutional harms arising from the operation of a statutory scheme to
the maladministration of the law, rather than the law itself, would thus take the
most effective constitutional remedy off the table. Because it crystalized in the first
Little Sisters7 case, we call this issue the “Little Sisters problem.” As we explain,
this remedial divide problematically obscures those instances in which systemic
misapplication of a law over a period of decades reveals a latent defect in the law
that calls for a constitutional response. This is a problem not only because it raises
serious access to Charter justice concerns, but also because it distorts lines of

Canada (Attorney General) v Bedford, 2013 SCC 72.
Both advance costs and special costs were of particular concern to Joe: British Columbia
(Minister of Forests) v Okanagan Indian Band, 2003 SCC 71; Little Sisters Book and Art
Emporium v Canada (Commissioner of Customs and Revenue), 2007 SCC 2 [Little
Sisters 2]; R v Caron, 2011 SCC 5; Carter v Canada (Attorney General), 2015 SCC 5 at
paras 133-146.
5 Canada (Attorney General) v Downtown Eastside Sex Workers United Against
Violence Society, 2012 SCC 45 [Downtown Eastside].
6 Some courts have chosen not to declare a constitutional wrong even when one has been
proven after a lengthy and contested trial. This is the outcome that obtained after the
appeal in the solitary litigation: British Columbia Civil Liberties Association v Canada
(Attorney General), 2019 BCCA 228 at para 213, 228, 269, 272. We view this outcome as
a stark example of misplaced judicial restraint, a topic one of us has written about
elsewhere. See Alison M Latimer, “Constitutional Conversations” (2019) 88 SCLR 231
(2d). It is notable that the exercise of such a discretion to refuse a remedy is not available
under s. 52. However, a full exploration of the issue of misplaced judicial restraint as it
manifested in the solitary case is beyond the scope of this article.
7 Little Sisters Book & Art Emporium v Canada, 2000 SCC 69 [Little Sisters 1].
3

4
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constitutional accountability, reducing systemic transparency by giving deference
to the executive that Parliament does not enjoy.
This paper proceeds in three parts. First, we describe this problem, how it
arose, and its effects in detail. Second, we describe in more depth the solitary
confinement litigation and the way the Little Sisters problem surfaced — and was
dramatized — in that litigation. Third, we set out an argument for the containment
of the Little Sisters problem, one based in the Court’s decision in R v Boudreault.8
II.

The Little Sisters Problem Defined

Two remedial provisions govern remedies for Charter breaches.
When a law is inconsistent with the Charter in purpose or effect, the usual
remedy lies under s. 52(1).9 Section 52(1) provides that the Constitution is the
supreme law of Canada, any law that is inconsistent with the provisions of the
Constitution is, to the extent of the inconsistency, of no force and effect. Parties
with standing can seek relief under s. 52(1) because of the effects of the law on
themselves or on third parties.10 Section 52(1) confers no discretion on judges. A
law that produces an unconstitutional effect is null and void to that extent by
operation of s. 52(1).11
Section 24(1), by contrast, gives judges wide discretion to grant just and
appropriate remedies, not for unconstitutional laws, but for unconstitutional
government acts usually committed under constitutionally valid legal regimes.12
The acts of government agents acting under such regimes may not be the necessary
result or “effect” of the law, but arise as a result of government agents applying a
discretion conferred by the law in an unconstitutional manner.13
The distinction has proven to be consequential not only at the pleadings
stage of a case, but at each stage in preparing the record and framing the
R v Boudreault, 2018 SCC 58 [Boudreault].
Constitution Act, 1982, s 52(1), being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c
11 [Constitution Act, 1982]; R v Ferguson, 2008 SCC 6 at para 59 [Ferguson].
10 Ferguson, ibid.
11 Ibid at para 35.
12 There are exceptions. For example, even in cases where legislation is unconstitutional
courts often suspend declarations of invalidity. The jurisprudence allows the court to
grant a s. 24(1) remedy in connection with a s. 52(1) declaration of invalidity where
s. 24(1) relief is necessary to provide the claimant with an effective remedy. One such case
was Carter v Canada (Attorney General), 2012 BCSC 886. This case established a
constitutional right to physician assisted death. In that case the declaration of invalidity
was suspended following the trial and Joe persuaded the trial judge to grant an individual
exemption to Gloria Taylor so that she could access a physician-assisted death during the
period of time when the declaration of invalidity was suspended (see paras 1414-1415).
Joe arguably persuaded the Supreme Court of Canada to do the same thing for a broader
group of people. See Carter v. Canada (Attorney General), 2016 SCC 4 [Carter 2] at
paras 5-6; although the Court did not make clear that the remedy was granted pursuant
to s. 24(1).
13 Ferguson, supra note 9 at para 60.
8
9
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arguments. In some cases, this distinction is clear but it is less so in others. The
murkiest cases are those where it is possible to assemble an extensive record of
systemic Charter breaches arising under a law over the course of many years either
against a single party or a representative class of persons.
Little Sisters was perhaps the most iconic example of this challenge at play.
This was a decade long pro-bono odyssey that Joe took to the Supreme Court of
Canada and then back again. Little Sisters 1 concerned harassment of a small
independent bookstore – Little Sisters Book and Art Emporium - by Canada
Customs. Little Sisters carried specialized inventory catering to the LGBTQ
community. Since its establishment it imported the vast majority of its erotica from
the United States. Large quantities of these materials were delayed, confiscated,
destroyed, damaged, prohibited or misclassified by Canada Customs even though
the Customs Act14 only allowed Customs to detain and prohibit material that was
“obscene” as defined in the Criminal Code.
The Supreme Court of Canada had earlier upheld the obscenity provision
of the Criminal Code15 as constitutionally valid in R. v. Butler.16 The Court held
that while the obscenity provision infringed s. 2(b) of the Charter, the
infringement was justified under s. 1.17 The Customs Act, the Court reasoned,
provided an intelligible standard so there was nothing constitutionally wrong with
Customs applying that standard.18
After a lengthy trial in Little Sisters 1, Joe persuaded the trial judge that the
rates of mistreatment by Canada Customs “indicate more than mere differences of
opinion and suggest systemic causes” and that “to attribute the errors
demonstrated in this trial entirely to human fallibility would be to ignore the grave
systemic problems in the Customs administration”.19 Thus, he was able to show
that Customs had systemically misapplied the Act such that Customs was detaining
and prohibiting much non-obscene material. Customs actually conceded that
many of the books it seized were works of literature.20 When the material was not
obscene, the violations of the Customs Act resulted in a violation of s. 2(b) of the
Charter that was not “prescribed by law” and therefore not justifiable under s. 1.21
Joe asked that the legislation be struck down under s. 52(1).22 The Supreme
Court of Canada was divided on the issue of whether the law itself was responsible
for the Charter breach, and therefore divided on the issue of remedy.
Iacobucci J., dissenting, reasoned:

Customs Act, RSC 1985, c 1 (2nd Supp), ss 58, 71, 152(3).
Criminal Code, RSC 1985, c C-46, s 163(8) [Criminal Code].
16 R v Butler, [1992] 1 SCR 452, 89 DLR (4th) 449 [Butler].
17 Butler, ibid at 489, 509-510.
18 Little Sisters 1, supra note 7 at para 25.
19 Little Sisters Book and Art Emporium v Canada (Justice), 131 DLR (4th) 486 at paras
100, 250, 1996 CanLII 3465 (BCSC).
20 Little Sisters 1, supra note 7 at paras 183, 185, 190.
21 Ibid at paras 18, 28, 37-8, 43-4, 70-2, 127-9, 131, 133, 135, 154.
22 Ibid at para 108.
14
15
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As noted, both my colleague Binnie J. and the courts below agreed that the
legislation had been administered in an unconstitutional manner. In their
opinion, the Customs legislation is capable of constitutional application and
therefore a declaratory remedy is sufficient to safeguard the Charter rights
involved. With the greatest respect, I cannot agree that this is the proper
approach. This Court’s precedents demand sufficient safeguards in the
legislative scheme itself to ensure that government action will not infringe
constitutional rights. In the face of an extensive record of unconstitutional
application, it is not enough merely to provide a structure that could be applied
in a constitutional manner. This is particularly the case where
fundamental Charter rights, such as the right to free expression, are at
stake. The legislation itself must provide an adequate process to ensure
that Charter rights are respected when the legislation is applied at the
administrative level.23
What followed was a detailed discussion of cases that came before – including
Morgentaler,24 Hunter v. Southam,25 and Bain26 - that Iacobucci J. reasoned
supported his opinion that the Court must be vigilant in protecting Charter rights
when the legislative scheme in question is being applied in an unconstitutional
fashion. In each of those cases, legislation was struck down because of procedures
set out in the legislation found to be unconstitutional.27
The majority disagreed that the cases relied on by the dissent were
comparable because in those earlier cases the legislation created problematic
procedures: it was not silent on what procedures should apply.28
held:

Iacobucci J. found this to be a distinction without a differencing when he
Regardless of whether the legislation is under- or over-inclusive, if it lends
itself to the repeated violations of Charter rights, as does the legislative
scheme here, the legislation itself is partially responsible and must be
remedied.29

The majority, by contrast, found that where legislation left room for
discretion so that it was capable of being construed in a constitutionally compliant
way, even when the evidentiary record established it has been systemically
misapplied, it should be upheld.30 For the majority, Parliament was not required
Ibid at para 204.
R v Morgentaler, [1988] 1 SCR 30, 1988 CanLII 90 (SCC) [Morgentaler].
25 Hunter v Southam Inc, [1984] 2 SCR 145, 1984 CanLII 33 (SCC) [Hunter]. (Matt’s
note: Would shorten to “Hunter” or “Southam”)
26 R v Bain, [1992] 1 S.C.R. 91, 1992 CanLII 111 (SCC) [Bain].
27 Little Sisters 1, supra note 7 at paras 205-213.
28 Ibid at paras 127-131.
29 Ibid at para 205.
30 Ibid at para 133.
23

24

-5-

to legislate procedures to govern state officials who had been shown to have
systemically misapplied a law.31 The majority refused to strike down the Customs
Act saying that the Court’s findings “should provide the appellants with a solid
platform from which to launch any further action in the Supreme Court of British
Columbia should they consider that further action is necessary.”32 (Joe was that
singular kind of guy who would attempt to take the Court up on this offer. That is
a story for a footnote.)33
Thus, the majority created a remedial cul-de-sac for systemic Charter
wrongs that are said to be the legal effect of the maladministration of a law. But a
remedy that relies on a pro bono lawyer and their clients, or some future litigant
suffering the very same wrong, to relitigate the same issue that has already made
its way all the way to Ottawa, is not a particularly concrete, practical or accessible
remedy. First, it ignores the experience of the governed who may rightly object
that proof of systemic misapplication of a law over a period of many years is
evidence that there is a problem with the law itself. Second, we live in a world thick
with executive control and a remedial divide such as that created in Little Sisters 1
foreseeably puts vulnerable communities in the position of policing the executive.
It will be these vulnerable communities, or rather individuals from within them,
who will be saddled with the expense of litigation and delayed vindication of their
rights, again and again. The Little Sisters problem thereby creates a significant
barrier to accessing the courts, which here is itself a barrier to accessing justice.34
The issue of access to justice has been at the forefront of public discussions
about the contemporary state of the judicial system in Canada. Whether in media
coverage, scholarly writing, or public lectures by those involved in the
administration of justice, the imperative of ensuring meaningful access to the
Canadian legal system has been much commented on. The Supreme Court of
Canada has itself consistently affirmed the centrality of this principle, emphasizing
in particular the importance of access to justice to protecting the constitutional
rule of law. Chief Justice Dickson stirringly stated in B.C.G.E.U. that “[t]here
Ibid at paras 134-139.
Ibid at para 158.
33 Never daunted, Joe geared up to pursue the issue once more but this time hoped to
secure advanced costs for his troubles. The issue of advanced costs went all the way to the
Supreme Court of Canada, resulting in Little Sisters 2. This case was almost the death
knell for the advanced costs jurisprudence. The issue of advance costs is an interesting
one close to Joe’s heart, but that is beyond the scope of this article. It is an issue that will
soon be back before the Supreme Court of Canada. See Germaine Anderson on her own
behalf and on behalf of all other Beaver Lake Cree Nation beneficiaries of Treaty No 6
and Beaver Lake Cree Nation v Her Majesty the Queen in Right of the Province of
Alberta, et al, 2021 CanLII 2827 (SCC).
34 For helpful discussions of Little Sisters 1, and some of the constitutional and access to
justice issues it generated, see e.g. Kent Roach, “Enforcement of the Charter —
Subsections 24(1) and 52(1)” (2013) 62 SCLR (2d) 473; Bruce Ryder, “The Little Sisters
Case, Administrative Censorship, and Obscenity Law” (2001) 39:1 Osgoode Hall LJ 207.
See also generally Carissima Mathen, “Access to Charter Justice and the Rule of Law”
(2008-2009) 25 Nat’l J Const L 191.
31

32
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cannot be a rule of law without access, otherwise the rule of law is replaced by a
rule of men and women who decide who shall and who shall not have access to
justice.”35 Appreciation of the reality of the scope, power, and opaqueness of the
executive state has implications for the way in which courts should construe the
scope of remedial authority under s. 52. Constitutions and constitutional rights
serve to constrain and discipline the exercise of state power.36 It is the role of the
elected legislators to constrain executive state action through the strictures of law.
Indeed, this is as close as one gets to an uncontested core meaning of that unruly
term, “rule of law.” Despite the important role that they play, the courts are not
competent or suited to perform this role in a comprehensive way. Where a litigant
can demonstrate systemic Charter wrongs at the hands of the state, it suggests that
more legislative reflection and action is needed. The matter needs to be remitted
the legislature — the more transparent and deliberative branch of government —
and the remedial route to do so is s. 52 of the Constitution Act. The executive
should not enjoy deference that Parliament itself does not command. Approaching
the control of the regulatory state in that fashion compromises the rule of law.
Thus, the Little Sisters problem is really two problems. It is a problem of
lack of access to justice for vulnerable communities. And it is a problem of lack of
government control, accountability, and transparency for all who care about the
rule of law.
III.

The Little Sisters Problem at Work: Solitary Confinement
Litigation

The Little Sisters problem has arisen in many cases and our attention here
is focused on one recent case from BC — a case challenging the federal laws that
authorized prolonged, indefinite solitary confinement.37 As we explain in some
detail below, the solitary confinement litigation was ultimately brought to an end
when Parliament repealed the challenged laws and abandoned its appeal to the
Supreme Court of Canada.38 Nevertheless, the case is worthy of consideration
because it so vividly demonstrates how the Little Sisters problem may impede
access to justice for vulnerable communities and hamper government
accountability and transparency.
BCGEU v British Columbia (Attorney General), [1988] 2 SCR 214 at 230, 53 DLR (4th)
1. See also British Columbia (Attorney General) v Christie, 2007 SCC 21 at para 23; R v
Prosper, [1994] 3 SCR 236 at para 102, 118 DLR (4th) 154 [Prosper].
36 Canada (Prime Minister) v Khadr, 2010 SCC 3 at para 37 [Khadr].
37 Joe and Alison contributed a chapter about the solitary confinement case that describes
the trial in more detail. See Joseph J Arvay and Alison M Latimer, “Solitary Confinement
in Canada” in Jules Lobel & Peter Scharff Smith, eds, Solitary Confinement: Effects,
Practices, and Pathways Towards Reform (Oxford Scholarship Online, 2019) 335.
38 Parallel litigation in Ontario was similarly brought to an end. See Canadian Civil
Liberties Association v Canada (Attorney General), 2019 ONCA 243. For a discussion of
the solitary confinement litigation, and the broader institutional and constitutional issues
it raised and that the practice continues to raise, see e.g. Lisa Kerr, “The End Stage of
Solitary Confinement” (2019) 55 CR (7th) 382, and the literature referenced therein.
35
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The BC solitary confinement litigation was one of Joe’s last major Charter
trials as the moving party. The plaintiffs were the BC Civil Liberties Association
and the John Howard Society who both had public interest standing to mount the
case. The trial spanned nine weeks in July and August 2017.
The trial record supported that for many years many inmates had been
subjected to prolonged, indefinite solitary confinement for periods of time
spanning weeks and sometimes years. These inmates were deprived of meaningful
human contact and caged in small cells for 22-23 hours a day.
The effects of the practice included serious and sometimes permanent
psychological harm, physical harm and death.39 The record supported, and the trial
judge found, that Aboriginal40 inmates and mentally ill and disabled inmates were
over-represented in solitary confinement, and also that solitary confinement was
more burdensome for these inmates.41
For many years, there had been repeated recognition of the harmful effects
of solitary confinement and repeated recommendations for independent external
review and time limits on solitary confinement. There had been a number of highprofile incidents involving solitary confinement that would lead to the introduction
of a policy of reform, but in general such reforms were poorly implemented,
delayed and resisted by the Correctional Service of Canada (“CSC”).42
On January 17, 2018, the trial judge declared the laws43 to be
unconstitutional, under both ss. 7 and 15 of the Charter, but suspended the
declaration for a period of one year.44 Canada appealed that order.
In respect of the section 7 claims, Joe succeeded in persuading the BC Court
of Appeal that the impugned laws themselves authorized prolonged, indefinite
solitary confinement of inmates. The laws therefore deprived inmates of life,
liberty and security of the person in a way so grossly disproportionate “that it
offends the fundamental norms of a free and democratic society.”45 As well, to the
extent the impugned laws authorized internal rather than external review of
decisions to segregate inmates in solitary confinement, the BC Court of Appeal
rightly held that those laws themselves offend the principle that laws must be
procedurally fair.46 The laws were struck down to the extent of those
inconsistencies.
However, in respect of the section 15 breaches, the Court allowed the appeal
in part. Although these issues had been contested at trial, on appeal Canada
conceded that the record supported a finding of discrimination against Aboriginal

BCCLA_Trial, supra note * at paras 247-250, 264-273, 277-288, 307-310, 328.
A term defined in the version of the Corrections and Conditional Release Act, SC 1992,
c 20 [CCRA] that applied at the time of the litigation.
41 BCCLA_Trial, supra note * at paras 64, 466-470, 484-487, 493-497.
42 Ibid at paras 23-48.
43 CCRA, supra note 40, ss 31-33, 37.
44 BCCLA_Trial, supra note * at paras 609-10.
45 BCCLA_CA, supra note * at para 167.
46 Ibid at para 198.
39
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inmates and mentally ill and/or disabled inmates.47 But Canada asked the Court of
Appeal to deny those wrongs a remedy arguing, inter alia, that none of these
operational failings are attributable to the legislation that authorizes
administrative segregation. Instead, Canada claimed the cause of these effects was
maladministration of the law.48 And Canada’s position was that the public interest
standing plaintiffs in the case lacked standing to seek remedies for these wrongs
under s. 24(1) of the Charter.49
Canada’s position in respect of the appropriate remedial route stemmed
from its interpretation of Little Sisters 1. The question, then, was: whether systemic
Charter wrongs like those proven at the solitary confinement trial can properly be
seen as authorized by or caused by a statute and therefore attract a remedy under
s. 52(1) to the benefit of all? Or are they to be seen merely as the effect of improper
administration of the law, insulating the law from constitutional challenge and
shifting to individual litigants the burden of policing state actors administering
those laws each time their rights are engaged?
In respect of the infringement of Aboriginal inmates’ section 15 rights, the
Court of Appeal found that the procedure said to give rise to the infringement was
not defined in the order. The Court held that the trial judge’s prescriptions for
curing the problems he identified “may be eminently sensible” but did not
“illuminate or speak directly to any constitutional infirmity in the legislation itself.
Implementation of the judge’s policy recommendations would not require
legislative amendment.”50 The failings identified by the trial judge were found by
the Court of Appeal to be “organizational failings” and “not sourced in the
legislation itself”.51 The Court therefore declined to grant any relief at all for these
proven Charter breaches instead holding that “[a declaration] would not assist
CSC in devising remedial measures and, apart from giving a form of judicial
expression to the Attorney General’s concession, would serve no useful purpose.”52
The Court’s refusal to grant declaratory relief – in the face of findings of
discrimination made following a contested hearing, and a later concession by
Canada – is troubling given its role as an institution with significant normative
Ibid at para 210.
Ibid.
49 Public interest standing was a topic close to Joe’s heart. Nine short years ago he took
the issue of public interest standing all the way to the Supreme Court of Canada in
Downtown Eastside. While that case clarified the law of public interest standing in
constitutional cases when the constitutional validity of a law is a stake, it did not address
what implications, if any, a grant of public interest standing has on the availability of
s. 24(1) relief. As noted here, that issue was squarely raised in the solitary confinement
case; however, a discussion of that issue is beyond the scope of this article. Instead, we
focus attention on the argument that the remedies sought were properly granted under
s. 52 of the Constitution Act, 1982. The issue of public interest standing is another one
that will soon be back before the court. See Attorney General of British Columbia v
Council of Canadians with Disabilities, 2021 CanLII 24821 (SCC).
50 BCCLA_CA, supra note * at para 213.
51 Ibid at para 214.
52 Ibid at para 272.
47

48
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responsibility to the parties and the public. In Khadr,53 the Supreme Court of
Canada held that in the face of evidentiary uncertainty and uncertainty over
whether a more specific remedy would be effective, the proper remedy is
declaratory relief. It serves the public interest to give judicial expression to findings
of discrimination against marginalized groups. Declarations of this sort may be
useful to the institutions implementing the law. But they are also of equal if not
greater significance to the group suffering unjust conduct at the hands of the state
who came to court to have those wrongs recognized, and to the public who should
rightly be made aware of and concerned with how society treats its most vulnerable
and whether that treatment is acceptable or not. The courts have a role in
recognizing and condemning that treatment through the issuance of declaratory
relief. The Court of Appeal was overly focused on whether and how CSC would be
assisted by its order, and insufficiently concerned with the importance of giving
judicial expression to proven Charter breaches which (although conceded on
appeal) were not conceded at trial.
However, the Court’s reluctance to grant a remedy lays bare another aspect
of the Little Sisters problem. While the trial judge made some “eminently sensible”
prescriptions to cure the problems he identified in respect of Aboriginal inmates,54
it was not his job nor within his institutional competence to redraft the legislation
or to write a new policy for CSC to follow to avoid breaching the Charter. Instead,
having identified the constitutional flaw, the matter would best have been sent
back to Parliament to remedy. However, because the Court of Appeal located the
defect in the administration of the law, and in thrall to the Little Sisters problem,
no such remedy was available.
In respect of the infringement of mentally ill and/or disabled inmates’
rights, the Court pointed to section 87(a) of the Act that “requires CSC to take into
consideration an offender’s state of health and health care needs in all decisions
affecting the offender including decisions relating to administrative segregation”.55
The Court held this provision required an individualized assessment of whether an
inmate’s mental health needs are such that the inmate should not be placed in
administrative segregation.56 The Court accepted Canada’s argument that the
judge erred by striking the legislation in circumstances where it was capable of
being administered in a constitutional fashion.57 The Court further criticized the
trial judge in stating that his order “provides no guidance to the legislature on
where the line should be drawn between inmates who are mentally ill and/or
disabled and those who are not. Neither do the reasons. They do not, in this
respect, facilitate the process of constitutional dialogue.”58
Of course, the concept of “constitutional dialogue” was developed in 1997
by Peter Hogg and Allison Bushell in their article “The Charter Dialogue between
Khadr, supra note 36.
BCCLA_CA, supra note * at para 213.
55 Ibid at para 220.
56 Ibid.
57 Ibid at para 231.
58 Ibid at para 228.
53

54
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Courts and Legislatures (Or Perhaps the Charter of Rights Isn’t Such a Bad Thing
After All).”59 But the concept of Charter dialogue was intended as a descriptive, not
a prescriptive one (as the BC Court of Appeal’s judgment seems to suggest). Those
urging this metaphor have said that they did not have in mind that the courts and
legislatures “were literally ‘talking’ to each other,” simply that court decisions left
room for, and usually received, a legislative response.60 In the solitary confinement
case, the trial judge’s declaration in respect of both Aboriginal and mentally ill
and/or disabled inmates achieved this end and left room for a legislative response.
Parliament could have done the work the Court of Appeal faulted the trial judge for
not doing – it could have developed a procedure in the Act to protect the equality
rights of Aboriginal inmates; it could have defined who was and was not mentally
ill and/or disabled for purpose of excluding that population from segregation. It is
the role of Parliament, not trial judges, to craft laws that address the constitutional
infirmities identified in the trial process. Declaratory relief granted following such
a process is not only “for” the executive and Parliament. It is “for” the claimants
and the public who have an interest in seeing that injustice will be recognized and
condemned as such by the courts and remedied by the legislator. Unfortunately,
by locating the constitutional flaw in the maladministration of the law, the Court
left no room for a legislative response and failing that declined to craft an effective
remedy.
Canada sought and obtained leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of
Canada.61 Joe intended to pursue this remedial issue on appeal. But then, after
many years of delay, Canada introduced new legislation repealing the impugned
laws and the appeal was abandoned. While it is perhaps encouraging to see
government reform laws that it repeatedly and publicly committed to reforming
for years and since before the trial even transpired,62 the end of the appeal left
many questions raised by the Court of Appeal’s judgment, including the remedial
one, unanswered.
Joe would have argued on appeal that given the section 15 violations had
been taking place for years and in very significant numbers, they could be safely
described as the necessary result of the law. Drawing on Morgentaler and the
dissent in Little Sisters 1, it was a flaw of the legislation itself that it failed to provide
an intelligible standard for (a) when inmates ought not to be subjected to solitary
confinement because of their mental health status, or (b) their Aboriginal social
history. Section 52(1) has been applied, and should be, in cases like this when laws
fail to provide an adequate standard for its application. A statute that authorizes a
treatment as brutal as solitary confinement must contain an intelligible standard
35:1 Osgoode Hall L J 75.
Peter M Hogg, Allison A Bushell Thornton & Wade K Wright, “Charter Dialogue
Revisited - or Much Ado About Metaphors” (2007) 45:1 Osgoode Hall L J 1 at 4, 7.
61 Attorney General of Canada v British Columbia Civil Liberties Association, et al, 2020
CanLII 10501 (SCC).
62 See e.g. Letter from Prime Minister Trudeau to Minister Wilson-Raybould (12
November 2015) online: <https://pm.gc.ca/eng/minister-justice-and-attorney-generalcanada-mandate-letter>.
59
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to identify categories of the population who will not be subjected to such a
treatment.
Failing adoption of that submission, he was determined to argue that, given
subsequent experience and jurisprudence, and especially Boudreault, the time had
come to rethink and reject the majority’s approach in Little Sisters 1, with these
fundamental problems for access to justice and constitutional accountability that
it produced. In the next section, we develop that argument using Boudreault.
IV.

The Little Sisters Problem Solved? R v Boudreault and “Latent
Constitutional Defects”

In this section of the article, we argue that, since the Supreme Court’s
decision in R v Boudreault, one need worry less about the negative effects of Little
Sisters 1. This is because, though Little Sisters 1 was not cited by either the
majority or dissent in Boudreault, the best reading of the case is that the majority
of the Court overruled — or, at very least, significantly limited — the principle from
Little Sisters 1 that so concerns us in this piece. Boudreault was received as an
important decision on s 12 of the Charter and an intriguing expansion of the story
of the Court’s treatment of mandatory minimum sentences, but it has not been
treated as a case of structural constitutional import.63 Our argument is that it very
much is. Future courts met with arguments that a constitutional harm is properly
traced to the maladministration of the statute, and that therefore no s 52 remedy
in respect of the statute is available, will have to reckon with this impact of
Boudreault.
Boudreault concerned the constitutionality of s 737 of the Criminal Code,
which provided for a mandatory victim surcharge. This victim surcharge had been
the subject of significant litigation, judicial consideration, and creative approaches
in the lower courts for some time, but Boudreault offered an opportunity for the
Supreme Court of Canada to weigh in on the matter. Several offenders challenged
s 737 on the basis that it constituted cruel and unusual punishment, contrary to s
12, that it offended s 7, or both. The case ultimately turned on the s 12 argument,
which focussed on the consequences of this mandatory surcharge on those who live
in serious poverty and face significant forms of disadvantage and social
marginalization. It was a somewhat unusual case in the arc of the Court’s s 12
jurisprudence in that, rather than arising from practices of incarceration, it
focussed on the consequences of an economic penalty and required an assessment
of “gross disproportionality” closely tied and sensitive to questions of social
location and economic equality. Indeed, and as with s 12 arguments in respect of
solitary confinement, the suitability of the analytic paradigm of “gross
disproportionality” for this kind of argument under s 12 has been questioned.64

63 That said, the decision of the majority to give immediate effect to the declaration of
invalidity was also notable and of import beyond the s. 12 frame.
64 See Lisa Kerr & Benjamin L Berger, “Methods and Severity: The Two Tracks of Section
12” (2020) 94 SCLR (2d) 235.
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Writing for a 7-person majority of the Court, Justice Martin found that s
737 of the Criminal Code violated s 12, having, as it did, “impacts and effects” that
“taken together, create circumstances that are grossly disproportionate, outrage
the standards of decency, and are both abhorrent and intolerable.”65 She found
that the violation was not justified under s 1 and declared s 737 invalid, with
immediate effect. Much can be said about the Boudreault decision. What interests
us in this article is the nature and, most critically, the proximate cause of certain
key effects of the surcharge that led Justice Martin to this conclusion. A careful
analysis of these effects is what gives rise to the conclusion that Boudreault tacitly
though clearly puts Little Sisters in its (now narrow) place.
Justice Martin identified four harms of the surcharge that, in combination,
lead her to her conclusion that the surcharge was unconstitutionally cruel and
unusual: “(1) the disproportionate financial consequences suffered by the indigent,
(2) the threat of detention and/or imprisonment, (3) the threat of provincial
collection efforts, and (4) the enforcement of de facto indefinite criminal
sanctions.”66 The exchange between the majority and the dissent (authored by
Coté J) on how to treat two of these harms — the threat of detention/imprisonment
and the threat of provincial collection efforts — illuminates Boudreault’s impact
on the principle from Little Sisters.
As Justice Coté emphasizes in her dissenting judgment, “a defaulting
offender cannot actually be imprisoned under s. 737 — that is, his or her liberty
will not be taken away — merely because of poverty”.67 The terms of the statute,
as interpreted by the courts, are clear on this point. How can it then be that Justice
Martin relies heavily on the threat of detention and/or imprisonment for the
impecunious offender as a reason that this scheme should be declared
constitutionally invalid? Justice Martin acknowledges the legal accuracy of what
Justice Coté emphasizes, but notes that it is nevertheless true that “offenders who
are poor, homeless, and addicted will live with the threat of incarceration and it is
reasonably likely that they will spend at least some time in detention as a result of
the surcharge.”68 Why? She notes that even though the offender might not
ultimately be imprisoned following a committal hearing, police officers may arrest
and detain to secure attendance at that hearing. Moreover, Justice Martin notes
that, once at the hearing, there is the practical problem of the difficulty that judges
face in “draw[ing] the line between and inability to pay and a refusal to pay.”69
Perhaps these consequences can be avoided through fine option programs or
extensions of time. Though Justice Martin notes that there is a release valve
available in the form of fine option programs, which allow people to work off the
fine, “fine option programs are not available in all provinces,”70 and as for
extensions of time, the processes for seeking those extensions are complex,
Boudreault, supra note 8 at para 94.
Ibid at para 65.
67 Ibid at para 152 [emphasis in original].
68 Ibid at para 69.
69 Ibid at para 71
70 Ibid at para 72.
65

66
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daunting, and are not a task for which state-funded counsel is available.71 The
result of all of this is a threat of imprisonment or detention that is grossly
disproportionate and offensive to s 12.
Consider the proximate causes of this harm, which contributes to the
unconstitutionality of the legislative scheme. The threat of imprisonment is a
result of the potential use of police discretion, the difficulty that judges have
applying the necessary legal standard, the failure of provinces to fund fine option
programs, and poor administrative design of the extension system. None of these
elements are found in the statute and indeed, as Justice Côté takes pains to note,
they are in some instances at odds with the design of the scheme. She notes the
legislation’s preference for a summons over a warrant and the presumption of
release pending the committal hearing. She notes that “to the extent that here is a
perceived need for guidance on exactly where to draw the line between inability
and refusal, it falls on this Court to make clear to lower courts that offenders need
not sacrifice their basic necessities in order to pay the surcharge.”72 And in respect
of the fine options programs and the daunting nature of the extension proceedings
that could relieve this threat of imprisonment, she observes — channeling the
principle from Little Sisters — that “[t]o the extent that a province establishes
procedures that are complex to the point of being inaccessible for many offenders,
this cannot be attributed to the impugned Criminal Code provisions themselves
but rather to the manner in which that province implements these procedural rules
and requirements.”73
In short, the threat of imprisonment that so compels Justice Martin’s
analysis is properly attributable to the maladministration of the victim surcharge,
not to the legislation itself. We think she is correct in tracing these effects to
maladministration of the s 737 victim surcharge. Nothing in Justice Martin’s
reasons convincingly disputes, or even challenges, this tracing. And yet the
majority holds the legislation accountable.
This arresting exchange, viewed from the perspective of the Little Sisters
problem, is repeated in respect of the second effect compelling a finding of
invalidity: the threat of provincial collections efforts. The dynamic and its
marginalization of Little Sisters is even more vivid here. Justice Martin notes that
although provincial collections efforts are not contemplated by the Code, they are
a “direct and known consequence of the surcharge it mandates.”74 She further
observes that (and the emphasis is ours), “[i]n terms of what actually occurs, trial
judges have noted with concern that responsibility for the collection of these funds
is sometimes delegated to private collection agencies”75 and that there was
evidence (brought by Pivot Legal Society) that “offenders in British Columbia may

Ibid at para 73.
Ibid at para 154.
73 Ibid at para 149.
74 Ibid at para 74.
75 Ibid.
71

72
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have their wages and even social assistance payments retained by the province in
order to collect the amount of the victim surcharge.”76
Justice Coté does not quarrel with the odiousness of these collection efforts.
Rather, her objection is in the register of Little Sisters. Her response is to clarify
the law. She reminds us that “civil remedies cannot be exercised as a means of
recovering unpaid surcharges from offenders.”77 The Criminal Code does not
permit a province to enter an unpaid surcharge as a civil order, so the “reasonable
hypothetical offender” is simply not vulnerable, as a matter of the proper
administration of the scheme, to this harm. Again, consider the proximate cause:
it is the unauthorized choice of provincial executives. This is a classic, clear case
of the “maladministration of a statute.” For Justice Coté this means that it is not
properly a factor in assessing the constitutionality of the legislation itself. Viewed
from Little Sisters, she is correct. The majority nevertheless counts this as one of
the harms that means that the victim surcharge offends s 12 of the Charter.
We have drawn this pattern out of these two reasons for the
unconstitutionality of the mandatory victim surcharge, in which the bypassing of
the Little Sisters problem is most vivid. But the overall tenor of the majority’s
analysis is consistent. There is no discernible difference in how the majority treats
or weighs harms that flow from the maladministration of the statute and those (like
the disproportionate financial consequences suffered by the indigent) that flow
more directly from the scheme itself. A strict application of the majority approach
in Little Sisters would have compelled Justice Coté’s approach: an indication of
when and where maladministration of the surcharge could violate individual
rights, clarification of the law to better guide state action, and the preservation of
the legislation. What happened to the Little Sisters problem?
We suggest that a sensitive reading of Boudreault against the backdrop of
Little Sisters suggests a significant refinement and softening of the
maladministration/legislation dichotomy. Specifically, the majority approach in
Boudreault should be read as establishing the principle that when demonstrated
and systematic rights-violative harms arise from the maladministration of a
statute, responsibility for those effects should be attributed to the statute itself.
This is because the legislation created the legal conditions precedent for those
harms. Those legal conditions precedent are comprised both of the powers and
points of discretion that the legislation created and also the measures not taken in
the legislation to mitigate the risks of misuse or maladministration of that scheme.
The law — and the legislator — will be responsible for the rights-violative world
that, experience has shown us, it has created. One might best think of these as
“latent constitutional defects” in the legislation — defects that, though not
apparent on the face of the legislation, are surfaced by experience with the realities
of the operation of the statute. Because they are demonstrated and systematic in
nature, these failings must be viewed as features of the statute itself; they cannot
be decoupled from the legislation without badly disrupting critical lines of
constitutional accountability and democratic transparency.
76
77

Ibid at para 75.
Ibid at para 166.

- 15 -

This understanding of the jurisprudential overtaking of the Little Sisters
problem calls for further filling in and elaboration using other recently decided
cases, a task that we intend to undertake in another piece, focussed on this point.
But interpreting Boudreault in this fashion makes the most (and, we think, only)
sense of the core nature of the dispute between the majority and dissent. They
agreed on the harms occasioned by the operation of the scheme. They agreed on
the formal legal structure and what it permitted and purported to preclude. The
difference was in the willingness to assign responsibility for the constitutional
harms of the maladministration of the scheme to the statute itself. This difference
is of constitutional moment, implicating the separation of powers and access to
Charter justice in the way we have exposed in this piece.
Does the principle from Little Sisters that so concerned Joe and has
provoked our article have any continuing role? We are open to the idea that if
Boudreault does not represent a full defeat of that proposition, it signals its
substantial retreat. It might be that courts ought to be cautious to hold legislation
responsible for Charter violations arising from the maladministration of the
scheme where the government can demonstrate that maladministration is isolated
or occasional in nature, or has arisen before we have accumulated experience with
the systematic operation of the scheme. As we have learned, to extend the principle
further invites constitutional injustice. And even then, we would do well to bear in
mind the question that Joe insisted we centre in our constitutional lives: who will
be forced to bear the burden of our timorousness?
V.

Conclusion

The gravamen of the “Little Sisters problem,” as we have described it, is
that it insulates statutory schemes from direct constitutional challenge by
attributing rights-limiting effects to the “maladministration” of the statute rather
than laying those constitutional harms at the feet of statute itself. Having been so
characterized, the constitutional harms are treated as the product of state action
rather than the consequence of law, taking the section 52(1) remedy sought by an
applicant off the table. Rather than engaging in constitutional review of legislation,
courts employing this tool shift to a recommendatory posture regarding executive
action implementing legislation.
As we have illustrated by reference to the solitary confinement litigation in
British Columbia, the negative effects of this move made possible by the majority
in Little Sisters are multiple. Most poignantly and pressingly, it puts vulnerable
communities who are foreseeably harmed by what one might call “the world
created by legislation” in the position of policing the executive — if the statute
continues to be maladministered, as it was in Little Sisters, it falls to these
communities to bring the matter back to the Courts, with the expense, delay, and
ex-post need for vindication of already-established rights that this involves. In
this, the Little Sisters problem is a problem of access to constitutional justice. But
the Little Sisters problem is also a problem in the structure of constitutional
accountability. Insistence on tracing unconstitutional effects to express features
of legislative schemes absolves the legislative branch of accountability for the
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foreseeable or even demonstrated effects of the legal worlds they have created.
Indeed, the Little Sisters move — inadequately checked and limited — incentivizes
an approach to legislation that directs more and more choices about
implementation to the executive actors, shifting the axes of constitutional
accountability in way that distorts the relationship among the branches of
government. Responsibility for solutions to the constitutional problems identified
by a court are sent to the less deliberative and less transparent branch of
government. The gift that the Court gave to the legislature with Little Sisters was
to allow it to remove itself too-readily from the Charter conversation.
As we have alluded to above, the principle from Little Sisters at issue in this
piece has never been entirely stable. Others have noted, and indeed Justice
Iacobucci noted in his dissenting reasons in Little Sisters itself, that the Court’s
practice prior to Little Sisters was inconsistent in how and when it would attribute
unconstitutional effects to legislation or to maladministration.78 We take
Boudreault to be a point for resetting this issue, providing guidance on how and
when, in practice, a court should lay the Charter violative effects of
maladministration of a statute at the feet of the statute itself.
Joe thought he was a plumber with words. He was also a deep and creative
thinker, an extraordinary teacher, and the finest advocate we’ve known. His super
power was his ability to take any legal argument you could dream of and package
it in a way that both courts and regular people could hear. What was striking about
thinking with Joe, was that his gaze was always on the horizon, every precedent
(even apparent victories) more of a question than an answer: what did the case
even stand for, could it be interpreted, built upon, or shaped in some principled
way to offer practical solutions to real world problems? We are grateful for the
questions we had the opportunity to ponder with Joe. This article has attempted
to map out one issue of significant importance not only to Joe, but which may be
of interest to all those concerned as he was with access to justice and the rule of
law. We would like to think that the overcoming of the Little Sisters problem is a
victory in waiting for Joe. When the Courts solve it, we will continue to celebrate
the long reach of his legacy.

Sujit Choudhury & Kent Roach, “Racial and Ethnic Profiling: Statutory Discretion,
Constitutional Remedies, and Democratic Accountability” (2003) 41:1 Osgoode Hall LJ 1.
78

- 17 -

